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Achieving the Paris Agreement’s aim of limiting average global temperature increases to 1.5⁰C requires 16 
substantial changes in the land system. However, individual countries’ plans to accomplish these changes 17 
remain vague, almost certainly insufficient and unlikely to be implemented in full. These shortcomings are 18 
partially the result of avoidable ‘blind spots’ relating to time lags inherent in the implementation of land-19 
based mitigation strategies. Key blind spots include inconsistencies between different land system policies, 20 
spatial and temporal lags in land system change, and detrimental consequences of some mitigation options. 21 
We suggest that improved recognition of these processes is necessary to identify achievable mitigation 22 
actions, avoiding excessively optimistic assumptions and consequent policy failures.    23 
 24 
 25 
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 26 
Human land use contributes approximately one quarter of anthropogenic emissions and severely constrains 27 
the expansion of terrestrial carbon sinks 1,2. Limiting average global temperature increases to between 1.5°C 28 
and 2°C, as agreed in 2015 by the 195 signatories to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change ‘Paris 29 
Agreement’ 3, will therefore require substantial interventions in the land system 2,4. These interventions 30 
must prevent further deforestation, achieve afforestation (or reforestation) over millions of hectares, reduce 31 
agricultural greenhouse gas emissions, and stimulate widespread adoption of bioenergy with carbon capture 32 
and storage. These are crucial components of many of the (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions 33 
(NDCs) by which countries propose to implement the Paris Agreement (e.g. 5–7), and also of the projected 34 
negative emissions pathways that must complement them 8,9.  35 
 36 
These – and additional - mitigation actions must now be implemented very rapidly if the Paris goal is to be 37 
achieved 10,11. However, proper assessment of mitigation options and NDCs requires factoring in the speed 38 
with which ambition and policy translate into beneficial on-the-ground activity. Without this, unrealistic 39 
expectations about the rate and extent of mitigation will delay and eventually preclude the adoption of 40 
appropriate targets 12,13. This effect is already clear in land-based mitigation policies, which are affected by a 41 
number of time lags that are rarely anticipated in the design of mitigation policies 14. Partly as a result, of the 42 
197 countries that have produced NDCs to date (representing 96.4% of global greenhouse gas emissions) 15, 43 
no major industrialised country has yet matched its own ambitions for emissions reductions 10. Of 32 44 
countries (representing 80% of anthropogenic emissions) considered by the independent scientific 45 
organisation Climate Action Tracker, only 2 (Morocco and the Gambia) are rated as achieving ‘Paris 46 
Agreement compatible’ implementation of their NDCs 16. Global CO2 emissions appear to have risen in both 47 
2017 and 2018 after previously levelling off 17. We argue that such setbacks can and must be avoided by 48 
improved assessment and recognition of the time lags inherent in land system policy-making, management 49 
change, and feedback dynamics. 50 
 51 
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Intended actions 52 
 53 
NDCs set out a number of relatively consistent approaches to reaching the aim of the Paris Agreement. 54 
Among these, changes in the use, management and cover of land are particularly significant, with land 55 
system sinks by 2030 expected to account for at least an additional 3.7 GtCO2e/y above 2005 levels (or 20-56 
25% of the emissions from all sectors) 18,19. Of the more than 175 countries that had produced an NDC by 57 
November 2015, nearly 100 explicitly identified mitigation strategies involving land use 18. The most common 58 
single strategy is related to increasing forest carbon sinks by reducing deforestation rates or increasing 59 
afforestation rates. The NDCs of India, Indonesia, Russia, China and, especially, Brazil, all emphasise this 60 
strategy, with Brazil and Indonesia planning to reduce land system emissions more than any other countries  61 
4,6,7,19,20. In Brazil, a 70% reduction in deforestation rates between 2005 and 2013 (from an average of 19,500 62 
km2/y to 5,843 km2/y) prompted plans for further forest-based emissions savings accounting for nearly half 63 
of the global total 18,21. China plans to increase forest stocks by 40 million hectares between 2009 and 2020 5.  64 
Agriculture is also expected to make a crucial contribution through, for instance, reductions in emissions 65 
associated with pesticide and fertiliser production and usage, pasture land restoration, agro-forestry 66 
initiatives, utilisation of agricultural waste products, water and soil conservation, and adoption of new crops 67 
(e.g. 5,7). Widespread bioenergy generation (with carbon capture and storage) is also fundamental to most 68 
projected pathways for achieving the Paris Agreement 9.  69 
 70 
Unrealistic objectives 71 
 72 
Many of the proposals contained in NDCs fall short of the ‘transformative’ change required by the Paris 73 
Agreement, as they represent or incorporate a continuation of established trends in national land systems 10. 74 
Furthermore, these trends are subject to a range of contingencies that are likely to reduce or negate even 75 
this insufficient contribution, and which make planned mitigation dependent on consistently high levels of 76 
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political will and capacity. One important example is the increase in deforestation that has occurred since 77 
the Paris Agreement, immediately undermining the assumption enshrined in several NDCs that deforestation 78 
rates would continue to slow as they had in the preceding years. For instance, deforestation increased by 79 
29% between 2015 and 2016 in Brazil and by 44% in Colombia 22,23. These increases probably occurred in 80 
response to higher demand for meat, failure to protect forest areas and indigenous peoples’ land rights, and 81 
even the demobilisation of the FARC rebel group, which had previously controlled logging across large areas 82 
in Colombia 21,23,24. Altogether, global emissions from deforestation and land use change appear to have 83 
remained stable between 2007 and 2016 17. Such setbacks can have fundamental implications for efforts to 84 
curb climate change: derailing ambitious targets, sapping motivation and engendering cynicism. However, 85 
experience shows that they are both more common and more predictable than they appear, often stemming 86 
from basic processes in three main areas: policy development, practical adoption, and indirect, 87 
unanticipated effects on other processes or areas. 88 
 89 
Policy development 90 
 91 
The voluntary nature of the Paris Agreement means that NDCs are not required to be demonstrably 92 
achievable, and in most cases have no defined plan of implementation even where sufficient political will 93 
and capacity exists 19,25. For instance, the contributions of land-based sectors to the EU’s binding target for a 94 
40% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 are yet to be established, leaving very little time for international 95 
policy design and implementation 26. These steps will be further complicated by ongoing scientific 96 
uncertainty about exactly how, and how much, land system mitigation can be achieved 19. Establishing the 97 
new, more ambitious policies that will need to be implemented in the second half of this century is likely to 98 
prove more challenging still 12,27. 99 
 100 
NDCs are therefore highly vulnerable to the complex, short-term and cyclical nature of the policy-making 101 
process. This process involves the repeated assessment of problems, opportunities and potential 102 
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interventions, all of which are subject to conflicts between different interests, before final implementation 103 
can occur (Fig. 1). Time lags exist at every stage of this process and can lead to lengthy delays, mistakes and 104 
reversals, affecting every facet of the NDCs within and beyond the land system. Indeed, perhaps the greatest 105 
single threat to achievement of the 1.5⁰ goal (aside from the long delay in adopting such a goal) is the 106 
likelihood, if not inevitability, of changes in policy objectives. The United States Government’s planned 107 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is one such example 28, as is the rapid increase in land clearing in 108 
Queensland, Australia, the rate of which rivalled that in Brazil following the rejection of stronger regulations 109 
by the Queensland Parliament 29.  110 
 111 
Such changes often result from legitimate democratic processes, driven by concerns about the loss of 112 
livelihoods, traditions and cultures, as well as perceived links between climate science, globalisation, and a 113 
lack of democratic accountability 30. Socio-economic inequalities within and between countries also create 114 
inevitable opposition to mitigation policies that are perceived as disproportionately penalising those who are 115 
most vulnerable and least responsible for global emissions 31. Strategies based on public participation, such 116 
as those that seek to empower indigenous peoples while presuming certain uses of their lands such as 117 
conservation or afforestation, are particularly at risk of failure 7,32.  118 
   119 
Equally capable of undermining mitigation policies is conflict between objectives or sections of government, 120 
which occurs at every stage of the policy cycle. This frequently subordinates climate policy to other sectoral 121 
and political considerations, resulting either in a failure to legislate at all (e.g. the Australian Government’s 122 
recent abandonment of emissions targets for the energy sector in line with the Paris Agreement 33), or 123 
contradictory objectives that undermine genuine mitigation (e.g. the Scottish Government’s development of 124 
‘world-leading’ climate policies and simultaneous financial support for fossil fuel extraction 34,35). Problems of 125 
this kind are exacerbated by the multi-functional nature of the land system and consequent trade-offs 126 
between mitigation and other land-based objectives. A stark example is provided by Oil Palm cultivation in 127 
countries such as Indonesia and, increasingly, Peru, which leads to substantial emissions from deforestation 128 
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and peatland degradation 36. Indonesia’s Forest Moratorium policy (designed to reverse the state-supported 129 
spread of Oil Palm plantations) has had limited or even counterproductive effects because of its 130 
incompatibility with existing policies and economic drivers, often producing only temporary slowing of 131 
deforestation in some areas and commensurate increases elsewhere 36,37.  Similarly, the decision by the 132 
Democratic Republic of the Congo to allow logging and forest resource extraction to recommence after a 133 
moratorium initiated in 2002 has contributed to continuing rapid deforestation 38. The rates of primary 134 
forest loss in the Congo and Indonesia are now 1.5 and 3 times the rate in Brazil, and continue to include 135 
widespread clearance of peatland 39.  136 
 137 
Such contradictions between policies are particularly hard to resolve where a lack of institutional capacity 138 
exists, posing major challenges for countries with poorly functioning governance and judicial systems as they 139 
attempt to reduce illegal logging 21,40. Similarly, nominal protections have been ineffectual in changing the 140 
behaviours of companies and communities involved in forest clearance in Indonesia 41, or in controlling 141 
deforestation in the Congo caused by smallholder agriculturalists escaping conflict zones 39. Russia’s 142 
ambitious plans for forest-based mitigation are also likely to be hamstrung by the fragmented, contradictory 143 
and ineffective nature of forest policies at different governance levels 42,43. Even where domestic political 144 
capacity is high, the scope for legislation may be limited by international trading agreements that allow 145 
economic interests to delay or override national policy objectives (e.g. through state-investor dispute 146 
settlement systems) 44,45.  147 
 148 
Adoption 149 
 150 
Even when implemented, mitigation policies suffer from further time lags as on-the-ground uptake occurs 151 
(Fig. 2). Many NDC actions depend on the willingness of people to adopt innovations in technology, crops or 152 
management approaches, particularly in the case of voluntary actions that play a substantial role in the 153 
NDCs of the USA, China and India, amongst others. For example, the United States Department of 154 
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Agriculture expects voluntary changes in agriculture and forestry to reduce net emissions by 0.12 GtCO2e/y 155 
in 2025 18, while China and India encourage reforestation through voluntary tree planting by all citizens 5,46. 156 
Such voluntary measures are likely to have less impact than those supported by regulations or subsidies, 157 
although they may play an important role in ensuring that local communities can engage meaningfully with 158 
mitigation efforts 21,47. Even where mitigation policies are supported by subsidies or regulations, however, 159 
uptake (or compliance) is generally a gradual, spatially-structured process that depends upon knowledge, 160 
socio-cultural context, personal experience and the presence of charismatic leaders or ‘champions’ who can 161 
initiate widespread action 47,48.  162 
 163 
There are already many examples of mitigation policies that have initially failed to deliver their expected 164 
benefits because of delays in uptake. The Brazilian Low Carbon Agriculture programme produced only 5 165 
approved projects in its first year (2010), though uptake has since been rising and now exceeds 25,000 166 
farms, approximately 0.5% of the Brazilian total 51. The 2012 Brazilian Forest Code has also had unexpectedly 167 
low uptake and compliance, perhaps due to inadequate financial incentives 52. It is anticipated that only 168 
around a third of the global mitigation potential in agriculture will be achieved by 2030, with major barriers 169 
existing in the developing world, where clear benefit to farmers must be demonstrated if uptake is to occur 170 
53.  171 
 172 
Uptake is likely to take even longer where it depends on a wider range of contingencies, for example where 173 
it spans polities or societies, generally only reaching saturation over decades rather than years as social, 174 
political, technological and economic forces interact (Fig. 2) 54,55. This is apparent in the recent development 175 
of agricultural ‘micro-insurance’ as a risk mitigation response to projected weather extremes. Initial uptake 176 
of this insurance has been very slow and spatially patchy, with uptake across Africa, for example, gradually 177 
increasing from 2005 onwards to cover 0.2% of the population in 2011 and 1.1% in 2014 56,57. Similar 178 
dynamics are at play in the global spread of Conservation Agriculture (Fig. 2), as practices to preserve soils 179 
and diversify crops are gradually recognised, promoted and adopted in different countries 50. The timescales 180 
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involved contrast sharply with those over which political decisions are made, increasing the likelihood of 181 
policies being abandoned or reversed before they have had time to take effect. Significantly for the Paris 182 
Agreement, delays in uptake are greatest where the agricultural sector comprises many small farms, as in 183 
the case of India and, especially, China 58. 184 
 185 
Indirect effects 186 
 187 
Climate and land system policies are strongly cross-sectoral, with dependencies that span traditionally 188 
discrete areas of research and governance. This can generate another form of time lag via indirect and 189 
counterproductive consequences that delay the achievement of expected mitigation targets. For instance, 190 
many of the changes proposed in the agricultural sector in NDCs depend upon balancing the potential 191 
benefits of intensification (e.g. land sparing) and its potential drawbacks (e.g. enhanced energy inputs, 192 
erosion and decreasing water quality) that tend to fall under the purview of different Government 193 
departments. Failures to adequately anticipate trade-offs of this kind have been a notable feature of climate 194 
policy in the land system, with policies for different sectors and for mitigation and adaptation often being at 195 
odds with one another 59.  In particular, mitigation policies focusing on bioenergy have often proved 196 
detrimental to food production, forest cover and, ultimately, the very mitigation targets to which bioenergy 197 
contributes 60. Similarly, EU renewable energy targets have been criticised for causing the loss of established 198 
forests in Europe, and with them important carbon sinks and ecosystems 61. International trade and 199 
telecoupling can make such unanticipated consequences more likely, as when successful regulation of illegal 200 
deforestation in one area increases timber prices and therefore legal deforestation in another area 62, or as 201 
in the case of EU bioenergy production and imports contributing to tropical deforestation 63. International 202 
policy has dealt with such counter-productive ‘leakage’, whether from public policy or private (corporate) 203 
initiatives, only to a very limited extent 63,64.  204 
 205 
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Counter-productivities can also result from excessive focus on particular outcomes. For example, failure to 206 
account for emissions of greenhouse gases (such as N2O) and O3 precursor gases from biofuels not only 207 
offsets their CO2 savings, but also decreases crop yields (as well as negatively affecting biodiversity and 208 
human health) 65,66. China’s ‘Grain for Green’ programme has similarly shown success in meeting its targets 209 
as defined, but with some negative socio-economic and ecological consequences that may undermine its 210 
long-term sustainability 67. Both of these examples may be symptomatic of the ways in which negative 211 
impacts of afforestation and bioenergy production on the provision of ecosystem services can lead to 212 
societal resistance or additional emissions, slowing the rate of effective mitigation 68.  213 
 214 
Failure to consider the cross-sectoral context of mitigation actions also risks double-counting their benefits. 215 
This is apparent in the reliance of several countries’ NDCs on existing decreases in rates of deforestation, 216 
implying a fundamental lack of truly additional mitigation, as well as a potential impermanence. As with 217 
Indonesia’s Forest Moratorium, any isolation of mitigation policy from economic drivers is likely to prove 218 
illusory, leading to leakage of destructive pressures to other areas 37. These effects are particularly great 219 
where the real or effective price of carbon is low, allowing other economic drivers to remain dominant, and 220 
where free trade enhances teleconnections 69.  221 
 222 
Ensuring achievability 223 
 224 
The various dependencies (and acknowledged insufficiencies) of the actions planned in support of the Paris 225 
Agreement mean that achievement of the 1.5⁰C goal is highly unlikely 10,70. Given the urgent need for climate 226 
change mitigation, there are strong arguments to be made for international climate policy to rely on binding 227 
or regulatory commitments that either take a leading role in economic policies or supersede them entirely 228 
25,45,71,72. Trading arrangements that actively promote mitigation or formal ‘peer-review’ of proposed policies 229 
have both been suggested as proven options 71,72. However, these approaches cannot in themselves ensure 230 
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rapid on-the-ground change, especially given the risks of democratic backlash and limited responsiveness to 231 
both scientific and political developments 30. 232 
 233 
A crucial step towards achieving the required level of mitigation is therefore the prioritisation of 234 
behaviourally-literate policy making that better accounts for the dynamics of land system change 73. These 235 
dynamics, as described above, do not simply represent complexities of the policy process, but linked and 236 
often logical responses to difficult, long-term challenges. As a result, the current failure to account for land 237 
system time lags in mitigation is not inevitable. Instead, it is possible – and essential – that these time lags 238 
are better anticipated, so that achievable pathways to limiting global temperature increases can be 239 
developed. 240 
 241 
At a basic level, these pathways should ensure obvious and immediate benefits to farmers, smallholders and 242 
foresters who undertake mitigation actions, especially in developing countries where land management 243 
options are scarce 37,53. Beyond such recognised solutions, existing evidence should be better exploited to 244 
identify promising strategies. Empirical studies of time lags in policy-driven land system change can 245 
illuminate political pathways to transformation 74, as well as allowing the incorporation of more realistic 246 
dynamics in models that project future land system dynamics to support policy decisions. To date, such work 247 
has usually focused on case-specificities rather than synthesis 75, leaving policy development to rely on an 248 
assumption of rapid or instantaneous adoption according to generic patterns 14. Furthermore, the sectoral 249 
nature of most analyses means that they are not able to illuminate many of the indirect effects that can 250 
undermine mitigation outcomes 75,76. These shortcomings can actively obscure the time lags identified here if 251 
the limitations of the knowledge base being used are not clear 77.  252 
 253 
We suggest that a small number of specific developments in land system research, modelling and policy 254 
development have the potential to dramatically improve climate mitigation policies by allowing exploration 255 
of the key time lags in policy outcomes. These developments cannot, of course, be allowed to introduce time 256 
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lags of their own, and so must complement an immediate recognition of the inherent delays in land system 257 
change.  258 
 259 
Firstly, improved recognition, understanding and modelling of the policy-making process should be 260 
prioritised. This can be achieved through ongoing research into governance structures and mechanisms, 261 
including the effects of cross-scale interactions from national to state to regional levels 78,79, and compilation 262 
of a wide range of relevant case studies including by expert elicitation and comparative analyses of political 263 
processes 14,74,80. Meanwhile, the development of agent-based land use models towards representations of 264 
political decision-making can contribute by generating empirically-based projections that inform policy-265 
development, replacing misleading assumptions 81,82.    266 
Secondly, there is a need for more research into processes and rates of uptake of land management 267 
approaches, allowing efficient targeting of policies as well as improvements to the ‘one-size-fits-all’ 268 
assumptions that currently dominate14,49. This is a necessary continuation of attempts to resolve top-down 269 
and bottom-up assessments of emissions reduction potentials 83. 270 
 271 
Thirdly, a substantial increase in the number and quality of analyses of indirect and cross-sectoral 272 
consequences of changes in the land system is required. These can build on existing economic assessments 273 
of trading relationships84, increasingly extensive knowledge of inter-sectoral and inter-locational impacts 85, 274 
and recent attempts to model coherent, multi-sectoral land systems 75,86,87. These may also help to identify 275 
promising new strategies such as the use of ‘natural climate solutions’ that use cost-effective land 276 
management changes to provide substantial mitigation alongside a range of other ecosystem service 277 
benefits 88, or ‘burden sharing’ between distinct policy areas 14. 278 
 279 
Finally, land system models should be embedded in appropriate uncertainty frameworks to identify robust, 280 
location-specific interventions 86, partly through integration of knowledge derived from different modelling 281 
paradigms 89,90. 282 
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 283 
These developments are significant but achievable, relying on existing and emerging research areas that 284 
have already established their utility. Of particular importance are ongoing moves towards integrative 285 
research that operates across scientific disciplines, case studies and models 91,92, as these not only reveal 286 
‘blind spots’ of the kind identified here, but also ways in which these can be accounted for. Such an 287 
approach is urgently required to identify implementable climate mitigation actions, and therefore to achieve 288 
the transformative changes envisioned by the parties to the Paris Agreement. 289 
 290 
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14: Explores the realism of assumptions about speed of land system change underlying mitigation 534 
projections and policies. 535 
19: Provides a detailed overview of the planned contributions of the land system to countries' mitigation 536 
actions. 537 
21. Elucidates the factors contributing to slowing deforestation in Brazil, as well as their vulnerability to 538 
political, social and economic change.  539 
39: Provides an up-to-date overview of rates and reasons for deforestation in countries with some of the 540 
largest planned land system emissions reductions. 541 
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Figure 1. Science-policy exchange: Science-based policy making is a cyclical process that involves potential time 
lags (red) at each step, which may also reduce policies’ ultimate impact. Whilst a cyclical relationship is shown, 
each lag can occur independently of any other and may prevent further progression. Time lags underlined in bold 
are those focused on here. Monitoring of policy impacts and feedbacks to new scientific research (dashed lines) 
are particularly uncertain processes that may not only involve time lags, but may effectively not occur. 
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 571 
Figure 2. Examples of time lags in uptake of innovations in land use (subsidy schemes, new crops or 572 
management approaches). Individual lines show cumulative uptake of each example, from the year of first 573 
data availability (re-based to year ‘0’; by which point some uptake may have already occurred). An uptake 574 
value of ‘1’ represents the maximum recorded cumulative uptake over the time period, rather than any 575 
measure of potential uptake; the plot therefore compares rates rather than extents of uptake, with ongoing 576 
increases indicating continuation of uptake processes.  Uptake is subject to relatively static conditions in 577 
some cases (e.g. subsidy schemes) and influenced by social, economic, technological and political changes in 578 
others (e.g. crop areas). Time periods and data sources: Agricultural insurance policies, Brazil (2006-2016) 93, 579 
Grain for Green subsidies, China (1999-2011) 94, Woodland Grant Scheme subsidies, Scotland (1988-2005) 95, 580 
Genetically engineered crop areas, USA (2000-2017) 96, Conservation Reserve Program, USA (1986-2015) 97, 581 
Oilseed Rape areas, UK (1969-1997) 98, Soy areas, Brazil (1961-1991) 99, Maize area, UK (1984-2014) 100, 582 
Conservation Agriculture areas, worldwide (1974-2013) 50.  583 
